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This paper argues that multilateral financial institutions (MFIs), such as the International Monetary 
Fund, play an important informational role in international financial markets. By providing low-cost 
and high quality information, that is otherwise very costly for private lenders to obtain, the MFI 
allows a private lender to form a more accurate estimate of the credit-worthiness of a sovereign 
borrower. This creates a positive externality for private lenders and for sovereign borrowers with 
low risk credit ratings that are revealed by the provision of MFI information. The MFI can choose 
to internalize the negative externality created for sovereign borrowers who are revealed to be a 
higher credit risk by providing stand-by commitments to the sovereign. We construct a formal 
model of the private lenders decision to purchase costly information about the sovereign borrower. 
The model suggests that the free provision of MFI information has greater positive effects on 
financial markets the less risk-averse the private lender, the less information the private lender 
already has, the greater the size of the loan, and the smaller the expected default probability of the 




“… the International Monetary Fund, although it is not an international central bank, has undertaken certain 
important lender of last resort functions in the current system, generally acting in concert with other official 
agencies -- and that that role can be made more effective in a reformed international financial system.” 
    Stanley Fischer
1 
 
“Through stronger surveillance, including encouragement of countries to make more timely data publicly 
available, the IMF would help to provide financial markets with the information that they need to form 
judgements concerning a country’s creditworthiness…” 
    Paul R. Masson and Michael Mussa
2 
 
“It’s time to kill the IMF.”  





Multilateral financial institutions (MFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, have come under increasing scrutiny regarding their lending practices, 
particularly in instances of a sovereign debtor nation facing a financial crisis. However MFIs 
serve other roles such as a provider of information concerning the credit worthiness of potential 
borrowing nations. Private lending institutions operating in competitive capital markets may not 
find it profitable to acquire detailed information for each potential borrower or may find the 
borrower unwilling to provide it. In this case, the IMF and the World Bank can act as 
intermediaries in the provision of costly information
4.  While broad aggregate indicators of 
economic performance can be obtained quite easily by private lenders through publications 
provided by official lenders (such as the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance), more detailed information is kept in confidence by official 
lending institutions. Private lenders may be able to “free ride” on this confidential information by 
observing terms for new commitments or reschedulings, for example, those completed by the IMF 
under Paris Club negotiations
5. Keeping valuable information confidential can result in excessive 
speculation and eventually a speculative attack on a sovereign’s currency and assets. 
   
                                                                 
1 Stanley Fischer, “On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort”, IMF Working Paper, 1999, p. 1. 
2 Paul R. Masson and Michael Mussa, “The Role of the IMF: Financing and its Interactions with 
Adjustment and Surveillance”, IMF Pamphlet Series No. 50, 1997, p. 25. 
3 Milton Friedman, “Its Time to Kill the IMF”, National Post, November, 1998. 
4 The concept of free riding on costly information is elucidated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1976). There the 
authors show that without free riders, product markets will fail to exist. 
5 Although IMF and World Bank commitments and loans are often made at concessional terms. 
Nevertheless the degree of concessions is often announced by the official lender, making it simple for 




The objective of this paper is to construct a model in which the information role of a MFI 
can be investigated. We consider the optimal choice that an international private lender faces 
when an MFI is willing to provide either free information concerning the creditworthiness of a 
sovereign borrower, or a loan commitment that will guarantee repayment of a portion of the loan 
in the event of default, but not both. Risk-averse private lenders operate in a competitive market 
where the riskiness of the sovereign borrower is incorporated into the market spread above 
LIBOR. Each lender must charge this market spread but can invest in costly information to 
determine an optimal loan size. Information reduces the variance of the distribution of the true 
default probability, allowing for a more accurate assessment of the expected utility from a loan. 
Lenders cannot observe the true probability of default, which can change due to exogenous 
factors, but can observe the variance of its distribution. Exogenous shocks to the measured 
probability of default (measurement error) and the loan demand of the sovereign prevent free 
riders from inferring shifts in the distribution of the true default probability. We do not consider 
adverse selection problems and we do not treat the loan demand of the sovereign explicitly. 
 
Research investigating the optimal acquisition of information by economic agents and 
firms can be roughly divided into three approaches: existence and uniqueness of rational 
expectations equilibria, imperfect competition models, and models of insider trading. Our paper 
utilizes the methodology of the first approach and that is where we focus our discussion. Examples 
of imperfect competition models that assess the welfare implications of information acquisition and 
first-mover problems can be found in Hwang (1995, 1993). A good review of insider trading 
models, and the existence of trading equilibria, can be found in Levine and Smith (2003). The 
rational expectations models typically assume a perfectly competitive market where a share of 
firms obtain a unit of information at a fixed cost which allows them to distinguish between demand 
and supply shocks to the market price. The rest of the firms are uninformed and only observe 
noisy market price signals. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) demonstrated that an equilibrium can 
exist in such a market, albeit for the special case of normally distributed shocks and exponential 
utility. Verrecchia (1982) extends this work by assuming that information acquisition is continuous 
with increasing costs and is endogenous to output decisions. Ausubel (1990) uses a more general 
utility function and non-normal shocks to derive an equilibrium. Barlevy and Veronesi (2000) 
demonstrate that many previous results do not hold with more general assumptions, in particular, 




on the setup of information acquisition models, but investigates the existence and uniqueness of 
equilibria, rather than tradeoffs in information acquisition which is the focus of our analysis. 
We model the lending process as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the private lender 
determines the optimal loan size and the optimal level of information acquisition, given the market 
spread, when the private lender faces costly information. We find that the optimal loan size is 
decreasing in the true default probability, the degree of risk aversion, information costs and the 
variance of the loan demand shock. The optimal level of information acquisition is increasing in the 
same factors. Partial loan guarantees offered by an MFI are exogenous. If partial loan guarantees 
are forthcoming, then they act as substitutes for costly information. In the second stage of the 
game, a choice of a free unit of information or an additional unit of loan guarantee is offered to all 
private lenders by the MFI. Partial loan guarantees serve the purpose of compensating sovereigns 
who will receive more onerous loan conditions from the revelation of negative information. To 
keep the model simple, in stage one we do not allow the private lender to form expectations of the 
amount of forthcoming free information or loan guarantee in stage two. We assume that the MFI 
has not demonstrated a systematic policy towards whether it “offers” in the second stage of the 
game, thereby preventing lenders from forming rational expectations in the first stage. 
If private lenders are optimizing, we show that the provision of free information is 
preferred by lenders exhibiting relatively low risk and large sovereign loans. For very risky 
sovereign borrowers, the provision of free information, that reduces the variance of errors in 
estimating the true default probability, is secondary to the fact that the default probability is already 
large. Greater risk aversion and greater information costs make partial loan guarantees more 
attractive to private lenders. At first glance, these results suggest that there is little role for MFIs 
to provide free information to private lenders since it is most preferred only for relatively safe 
loans. In fact, estimated default probabilities for most sovereign borrowers are low enough to 
suggest that free information may play a very large role in improving the efficiency of sovereign 
lending markets. Given that even large MFIs face a limit to their resources, optimal resource 
allocation between information acquisition and provision, and partial loan guarantees is an 
important issue. 
MFIs are coming under increasing pressure to engage in information provision. The 
informational role of official institutions in debt negotiations through the Paris Club is described in 
Lee (1993). There he argues that official institutions serve the role of avoiding market failure 




and surveillance to certify the credit-worthiness of the sovereign borrower. Eckaus (1982) (cited 
in Lee (1993)) notes that the IMF and World Bank perform tasks “that no market exists to do and 
that would not or could not be done even by perfect financial markets.” He further adds, “These 
missions generate data and arrive at mutual agreements which are not obviously achievable by 
private financial markets but which, nonetheless, appear to be useful to private institutions.” 
Government attempts to establish monitoring agencies, outside the IMF and World Bank, 
for sovereign LDC loans have not faired well (Rodriguez (1992)). Prior to 1983 there was no 
comprehensive reporting by private banks on international exposure to LDCs. The Institute for 
International Finance was created by private banks to assess exposure and country credit-
worthiness in 1983, but played only a minor role in international lending. The International Lending 
Supervisory Act (ISLA), approved by the U.S. Congress and Senate in 1983, outlined a five-point 
program to supervise international lending. Among the stipulations of the Act were continued 
access of the indebted nations to new funds, the provision of tools to discipline lending to countries 
failing to implement IMF adjustment programs, and to discourage international lending which 
serves to increase private banks assets at the expense of higher risk. Information provision fell 
well down the list of objectives. International banking groups used the provisions of ILSA to form 
a creditor cartel which imposed onerous conditionality policies on heavily indebted LDCs. Net 
transfers from Latin America abroad totaled some $125 billion US from 1982 to 1988. A recurring 
theme throughout this period is the recommendation by ILSA to improve information provision and 
risk analysis by private banks
6. With the recent turmoil in financial markets, the IMF and World 
Bank have made extensive efforts to i ncrease the amount of information available to credit 
markets and to improve on its quality
7. In 1996, the IMF established the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard that sets standards for good practice in the dissemination of financial and 
economic data. In 1999, a joint World Bank – IMF surveillance project called the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program was established to further improve the financial monitoring of member 
countries. 
 
                                                                 
6 ILSA contained recommendations to force private banks to disclose information about foreign loans. 
In a 1988 report, the United States General Account Office recommended that forecasts be made for 
countries very likely to develop debt servicing problems and that deficiencies in the information used 
to determine loan ratings be eliminated. 




The next section develops a model in which an MFI obtains and reveals valuable 
information concerning a sovereign borrower that would not otherwise be made available to 
private lenders due to prohibitively high costs. The market assesses the new information and 
perceives the participation by the MFI as an offset to any negative information that otherwise 
reduces the expected value of new loans. MFI information can change loan pricing via two 
mechanisms: information can shift the perceived probability of default, and; information can 
reduce the variance of the distribution of the  perceived probability of default. Even if MFI 
information does not shift the distribution, it can make matters worse for the risky sovereign 
borrower by reducing its variance. 
 
2. A Model of Lending with Uncertain Default Risk 
   
The setup of our model is similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Verrechia (1982), 
but also includes elements that are specific to the international lenders problem. Consider the 
problem of a risk-averse private lender
8 who maximizes expected utility from profits by 
determining the optimal size of a loan, L t, to a sovereign LDC borrower. We consider a simple 
one-period environment in which the loan is used to purchase capital, not to purchase pure 
consumption goods. The lender faces a constant opportunity cost of r, here assumed to be the 
LIBOR rate, and receives a rate of return, rt on the loan. For simplicity, all loans have a maturity 
of one period. The loan market is competitive, however different sovereign borrowers may face 
different loan rates due to varying risk characteristics. 
The private lender forms an estimate of the probability that the sovereign borrower will 
fall into arrears, pt, at the end of the time period when the loan, plus interest, is due. The actual 
amount of arrears as a proportion of the size of the loan, at = At/Lt, is assumed exogenous and 
independent of  pt
9. The default probability  pt is formulated using an information set which is 
gathered at some cost Ct, independent of the loan size. If the fundamental probability of default is 
given by  p  which is assumed constant over the lifetime of the loan, then the estimated probability 
                                                                 
8 Private lending is not often performed by only one lender, rather a groups of lenders form a banking group 
who then assign a lead bank as the principal negotiator. We treat the banking group as a single lender here. 




of default is given by pt =  t p  + mit where mit is a measurement error for the ith lender at time t, 
mit ~ N(0, 
2
m s ).  
By acquiring costly information, the lender can reduce the variance of  pt that is the 
variance of the error term 
2
m s
10. The exact nature of how a “unit” of information reduces the 







d + =                   (1) 
 
The term d > 0 is a fixed cost of information acquisition. This is justified since just to be in 
the lending business, a lender must be able to form a value for  p even without additional 
expenditures of information to reduce the variance of p. The term b > 0 partly determines the 
marginal cost of information.  
The loan market is characterized by perfect competition, however each lender will have 
an incentive to gather an information set in order to estimate the probability of default. We assume 
the information set is unique to each lender. Lenders cannot benefit by free-riding on each others 






it m  so that the market spread for each 
sovereign borrower reflects accurate information concerning the borrowers credit-worthiness. A 
potential lender sitting on the sidelines will observe changes in the market spread, s, that we 
assume to depend upon a function of the underlying fundamental probability of default and a 
demand shock so that  ( ) t t t t d s s + = p , where dt is a demand shock caused by an unexpected shift 
in the borrowers marginal product of capital. For convenience we assume dt ~ N(0, 
2
d s ). Current 
lenders will know this and will have an incentive to acquire more costly information to determine if 
their spread, in relation to other lenders, is the correct one
11.  
An international agency, hereafter referred to as the IMF, possesses information 
concerning the riskiness of lending to sovereign borrowers that is not obtained by private lenders 
                                                                 
10 The information literature refers to the inverse of the variance as the “precision” of the information. 
11 A perfectly competitive lending market would allow lenders to simply sit on the sidelines and observe the 
market spread, which ideally would be a market average of the default probabilities estimated by each lender. 
Market failure could result with no lender investing in costly information. It is possible that the IMF exists to 




due to high acquisition costs. The IMF disseminates this valuable information to all private lenders 
at zero cost. The reason for this is that the IMF would like to promote an efficient capital market 
for sovereign lending in order to minimize it’s involvements in potential sovereign defaults. When 
the IMF information is revealed, private lenders may revise their assessments of the sovereign 
borrower’s riskiness, ie. the default probability pt. If the information suggests the sovereign is in 
better economic health than estimated by private lenders,  pt will fall from the lender’s initial 
estimate and the optimal loan size L t* will increase. Any official IMF involvement will not be 
required for loans of this type. On the other hand, if the IMF information reveals a substantially 
riskier sovereign borrower, pt will rise and the optimal loan size Lt* will be reduced, perhaps to 
zero. 
While the effect of IMF information on  pt i s uncertain, its presence always serves to 
reduce the variance of the measurement error of pt, 
2
m s . Uncertainty enters the model in two 
ways: through the uncertainty of which state will be revealed in period two, and through the risk in 
estimating pt. All private lenders receive the IMF information so that there are no disadvantaged 
lenders. This differs from the approach assumed for information dissemination in equity markets 
by Levine and Smith (2003). In equity markets, an insider may provide valuable information to a 
small subset of traders, leaving all others disadvantaged. If too many traders are “informed”, a 
market-maker will not be able to earn positive profits by matching traders and the market will fail. 
The welfare effects of information are difficult to assess when one trader has inside information 
he or she is willing to share with only a few other traders. In our approach, information has a 
distinctly positive effect on welfare. 
The role of the IMF in our model does not end at simply providing valuable information. 
When information is revealed, some sovereign borrowers will benefit (higher L t* at more 
favorable terms) and some will be made worse off (lower Lt* at harsher terms), but a necessary 
requirement for the role of the IMF in sovereign capital markets is that there be a net benefit 
overall. To avoid defaults forced upon sovereign borrowers by the dissemination of valuable 
information, the IMF provides compensation in the form of an immediate debt relief payment 
equivalent to the reduction in the expected profit of the private loan. The objective is to insure that 
sovereign borrowers still receive the same loan that would have been made had the IMF 




paid directly to the sovereign borrower, which then finds its way back to private lenders through 
immediate debt service payments
12.  
The private lender’s total profit Xt from the two-period loan is given by 
   




it it C L r X X X - + - - = 1 p             (2) 
 
where Xt
G represents total profit in the good state, 
 
( ) ( ) it t it t
G
t L s r L X + + = + = 1 ( 1 r             (3) 
 
where Xt
B represents the loss in the bad state where the sovereign borrower defaults. 
 
  ( )( ) ( ) it t t it t t t
B
it L s r L a X g m r + + = - + = 1 1           (4) 
 
The term g is the expected rate of return in the bad state. It is the difference between the 
percentage of the loan that falls into arrears (at) and the percentage of the loan that is covered by 
an IMF commitment (mt). In the worst case scenario for the lender, the bad state occurs at the 
end of period one so at = 1 and m  = 0, and consequently g = 1.  The entire principle and accrued 
interest on the loan are lost. Generally bad states are characterized by partial defaults where at < 
1. 
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12 We do not address the question here of which private lenders will receive the IMF subsidy. Later in the 
paper we will assume that a private lender has a choice between free information or a subsidy, but not both. 
Since the lenders loan portfolio is composed of sovereign borrowers possessing different degrees of default 
risk, lenders will prefer a loan subsidy for some loan contracts, and free information for others. 
13 Although many functional forms will generate similar results for our model, this utility function displays 





The utility function has the usual properties, u’>0, u”<0, and  a is the Arrow-Pratt 
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The market price for loans is given by  t t d s + , which is obtained from a reduced form 
expression that equates loan demand and supply
15. With risk averse lenders, substituting (6) into 
(5) and taking expectations gives the Zit as
16 
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.. The first order conditions are 
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where  ( ) t t t t s V g p - =  and 
4 2 ' m m C C s b s - = ¶ ¶ = . Perfect competition implies that 
lenders earn zero profit after information costs, thus  0 = - it it t C L V . To insure diminishing 
                                                                 
14 In the derivation of (6), higher order products – p?r or p?s – are discarded as likely to be “small” relative to 
the rest. 
15 We cannot obtain an exact solution for the market spread since we do not model sovereign loan demand. 
For the same reason, we also do not discuss whether an equilibrium loan contract exists, rather we simply 
assume one always does. Credit rationing may prevent a feasible loan contract from existing. In this case, 
the supply curve is backward bending with the assumption s =s(p, L) and p = p(s). If loan demand is 
everywhere above loan supply, a feasible loan contract may not be obtainable. See Kletzer (1984) for an 




marginal utility in Lit and 
2
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2 2 m s ab <                   (11) 
 
The first condition insures that expected marginal profit from loans be above a geometric 
average of the two variances (when g = 1), or more simply, that the variances cannot be too large. 
The second condition requires that neither the marginal cost of information (b) or the negative 
portion of marginal utility (a) is too large or utility will become negative. 
Solving (8) and (9) for the solutions for Lit and 
2
m s  gives 
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=              (13) 
 
To insure that ( 12) and (13) yield positive solutions,  a and  b cannot be too large. In 
addition, we rule out gt = 0 (no loss in the bad state) to insure 
2
m s  <  ¥ (no information is 
purchased). Finally we also rule out 
2
d s  = 0 since this would allow all private lenders to fully infer 
the true value of pt from observing movements in the market spread.  
An increase in the marginal cost of information (b) reduces the optimal loan size and 
reduces the optimal amount of costly information
17. An increase in risk-aversion (a) reduces the 
optimal loan size, but also reduces the amount of information purchased. One normally thinks that 
more information reduces ones exposure to risk, hence lenders should acquire more information if 
they are more risk-averse. From (7), an increase in a reduces utility so the lender must undertake 
actions to minimize this loss. Since L
2 appears in the second term of (7), L must be reduced. Both 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
16 In deriving (7), we have assumed that the covariance of m and d is zero: COV(mit, dt) = 0 and that these two 
shocks do not covary with the expected value of any other variables in the model. 







m s  appear in the second term as well, however the C
2 term has a larger coefficient, so 
reducing information costs is the optimal decision to minimize the loss in utility. An increase in the 
variance of the demand shock, 
2
d s , increases the lenders exposure to risk. The correct response 
is to reduce the optimal loan size and reduce information costs for the same reasons as given for 
an increase in risk-aversion. An increase in the expected default probability,  p , reduces the 
expected profit from the loan through V . The lenders optimal response is to reduce the loan size 
and spend less on information (since the marginal benefit of information is scaled by L).  
These static results are not too surprising, with one exception. An increase in the 
expected loss per dollar of loan in the default state (g) reduces the overall expected value of the 
loan. The lender responds by reducing the optimal loan size and  increasing the amount of 
information purchased. The key is found in (7) again. Increasing  g unambiguously makes the 
second term in (7) larger, reducing utility. Reducing 
2
m s  is the only option to the lender, even 
though this comes at a higher information cost. This result suggests that information and a partial 
loan guarantee (m) are substitute goods to the lender. This substitutability result is important for the 
discussion in the next section. 
 
3. IMF Participation 
 
Would a private lender prefer that the IMF provide accurate information at zero cost or a 
bailout that lowers the value of g, the expected return in the bad state? Both actions would raise 
expected utility for the lender and, obviously, the lender would prefer that the IMF provide both. 
As long as the IMF stood ready to provide financial assistance to sovereign borrowers whose 
probability of default is revealed to be h igher than previously expected, the provision of free 
information would make financial markets better off in terms of utility. This in itself, provides one 
justification for the provision of IMF assistance as part of an information-assistance mandate.  
Suppose we have a private lender who is maximizing utility according to (12) and (13). An 
MFI, like the IMF, approaches the lender and offers a choice. The offer is either an extra unit of 
high-quality information at zero cost, which will allow the lender to form a more accurate estimate 
of  t p  and thus raise its utility by reducing risk, or an additional unit of loan commitment that 




higher marginal utility. Inserting the solutions in (12) and (13) into (7) gives the indirect utility 
function. The marginal utility of 
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The marginal utility of g, with costly information, is given by (after simplification) 
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Lenders would prefer a partial bailout ( 0 < m < 1) that lowers a t to more information 
(lower 
2
m s ) if the marginal utility of g with costly information is greater than the marginal utility of 
2












































g e  < 0 and is the elasticity of L with respect to g evaluated at the maximum, and 
*
g h  < 0 
and is the elasticity of 
2
m s  with respect to g, also evaluated at the maximum. 
Condition (17) provides a rich set of conclusions regarding the private lenders preference 
for more information instead of a larger loan guarantee. Everything else the same, higher risk 
                                                                 




aversion ( a) makes it more likely that the lender would prefer information to a larger loan 
guarantee. Looking at the condition another way, for two loans of identical risk aversion and 
expected default probability, but different sizes, the lender is more likely to prefer more 
information for the larger loan. From (17) it is clear that a higher expected default probability 
makes a partial loan guarantee more attractive. For very risky sovereign borrowers, the provision 
of free information that reduces the variance of errors in estimating the true default probability is 
secondary to the fact that the default probability is large. A partial loan guarantee (higher m) has a 
much larger positive effect on utility and the expected value of the loan. Finally, the smaller the 
amount of information the private lender already has (large 
2
m s ), the more likely greater 
information will be preferred to a larger loan guarantee.  
Condition (17) is a rather unruly expression since it contains implicit solutions for L and 
2
m s . To evaluate i ts properties further, we simulated a system of equations including (12), (13) 
and (17). The initial parameter values, given by, given by a = 0.0001, b = 0.12, g = 0.1 (m = 0), 
2
d s  
= 0.0001, s = 0.01 and p = 0.05, were chosen so they satisfied the second order conditions in (10) 
and (11)
19. With these parameter values, the solutions for L, 
2
m s , Z and U(Z) were $465,360 
0.00074, 767.7 and  –0.926 respectively
20. The system was then simulated by incrementing the 
parameter values for  a, b, 
2
d s  and  p separately. The results appear in Figures 1 to 3. The 
solutions for L and 
2
m s  diminish as any of the four parameter values is increased. Since increases 
in any of a, b, 
2
d s  and p reduce the lenders utility, the optimal response is to reduce the scale of 
lending and information investment. This summarizes the results for the private lender at the end 
of the first stage of the game. 
In the second stage of the game, additional information and partial loan guarantees are 
free goods, however if the lender is forced to choose one or the other, the optimal choice will 
depend upon the marginal rate of substitution between the two options. The marginal rate of 
substitution is simulated as the ratio of the marginal utilities given in (15) and (16) and represents 
the rate at which the private lender would optimally substitute less information for a larger loan 
guarantee, given the optimal amount of information already purchased and the optimal loan size at 
                                                                 
19 We computed the ratio of arrears to the total stock of long-term debt for a large sample of LDCs to obtain 
a value for g.  (Source: 2002 Global Development Finance CD-ROM, The World Bank). 
20 Recall that the variances 
2
m s  and 
2




the end of stage one of the game. The results appear in Figures 4. In Figure 1, as b increases, 
additional information becomes more costly if acquired privately in stage one. Not surprisingly, the 
partial loan guarantee (lower g) becomes the preferred option at the start of stage two since the 
marginal rate of substitution diminishes and may fall below one at some value of b. We cannot 
determine if a private lender will choose the free information or the free partial loan guarantee at 
the start of stage two as the initial marginal rate of substitution is sensitive to the parameter values 
chosen at the start of stage one. We can only determine the direction in which the marginal rate of 
substitution moves with changes in the initial parameter values. With technological advancements 
and greater monitoring of sovereign borrowers, information costs for private lenders are probably 
falling quite rapidly, making the provision of free information more likely to be the preferred option. 
Figure 4 also demonstrates that an increase in 
2
d s  reduces the marginal rate of 
substitution, and thus the preference for more free information over a free partial loan guarantee. 
An increase in 
2
d s  reduces the informational content of the market spread in determining the true 
default probability. As 
2
d s  becomes very large, demand shocks completely dominate random 
measurement errors and any further information acquisition will have only a marginal effect on 
reducing the variance of the measured default probability. Since estimating a default probability 
accurately becomes very difficult, the private lender would prefer a partial loan guarantee. 
Greater absolute risk aversion (higher a) reduces the marginal rate of substitution so that the free 
partial loan guarantee becomes a more probably choice for the lender.  
Figure 4 finally demonstrates the most powerful conclusion of the simulation results. As 
the true probability of default rises, the marginal rate of substitution falls quickly so that partial loan 
guarantees are preferred, even at moderate default probabilities
21. This makes intuitive sense. If 
the true default probability were to increase to one, default is a certainty and the only way a 
private lender will lend any amount to the sovereign is with a gratis full loan guarantee. This is an 
extreme case, but if the true default probability is less than one but large, the distribution of the 
measured default probability will be centered on a large value, and the value of additional 
information to “home in” on the true default probability is slight. Essentially the mean measured 
default probability outweighs it variance since default is almost a certainty. 
                                                                 
21 If we modeled p as the weighted average default probability for the private lenders loan portfolio, the 
lender would accept free information for some loans, and free partial loan guarantees for the others, and 
adjust loan shares (and thus their risk exposure) in the portfolio until the marginal rate of substitution 




From (17) and the simulation results, we can construct a picture of the typical situation in 
which the IMF should consider providing accurate information at zero cost instead of greater 
participation in the loan package in the form of a partial commitment: A risk-averse private lender 
with little information is making a large loan to a sovereign borrower with a reasonably low 
probability of default. This scenario probably characterizes the bulk of private loans to sovereign 
borrowers. Barney and Alse (2001) estimate ex post default probabilities for a sample of 54 LDCs 
over the 1985-91 period, using four statistical methods
22: OLS, Logit, a neural network, and a 
genetically trained neural network (GTO). Sovereigns tend to fall in the extremes when ex post 
probabilities are estimated. For sovereigns that did not default in a given year, the estimated 
default probability is below 0.14 for the best fitting GTO method, while the estimated default 
probability is greater than 0.86 for sovereigns that did default in a given year. Early warning type 
models that are forward looking would probably provide default probabilities in the intermediate 
range for some LDCs, although we could not locate any references that computed default 
probabilities
23. Nevertheless for relatively safe sovereign borrowers, the probability of default is 
close to zero and our model suggests that a financial intermediary should allocate its scarce 
resources to providing valuable information, instead of providing free loan commitments. 
The model also suggests curious possibility for international lending. By packaging several 
smaller loans to a single sovereign borrower into one large loan, assuming the default probability is 
not affected, the IMF may encourage the lender to prefer free information, rather than a partial 
loan guarantee. Since partial bailouts might provide an incentive for sovereign borrowers to 
default, or at least to pursue irresponsible domestic policies, larger loan packages accompanied by 




Institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and others intrude on private lending, Their 
actions take place in a number of dimensions two of which we categorize under the rubrics of 
information and bailout. By providing a model of private lending that incorporates the impact that 
MFIs have on the private lender, we explore systematic environments in which one or another 
                                                                 
22 Default is defined as the need for a rescheduling of loan contracts. 





MFI strategy is preferred by private lenders. We have developed a model that proposes conditions 
under which it is optimal (in the sense of increasing the utility of private lenders) for a MFI to 
provide information concerning the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower free of charge to a 
private lender over providing a free partial loan guarantee. The best-case scenario in favor of 
information provision is that of a relatively low risk sovereign borrower with relatively certain loan 
demand requiring a large loan. The usefulness of this approach is that it highlights systematically 
the way in which MFIs intervene in markets and more generally raises the implicit question as to 
whether these institutions are themselves aware of the systematic tradeoffs.  A more complete 
characterization of the international environment would be one in which there were explicit and 
identifiable objectives of the MFIs themselves. These could then be squared with the impact on 
the market actors with whom they interact, and a richer discussion of an optimum could then be 
addressed. 
The model developed in the paper is only a partial equilibrium one. A more complete, 
general equilibrium model would incorporate the sovereign’s loan demand explicitly, as well as the 
optimization problem facing the MFI. Borrowers and  lenders could be allowed to form rational 
expectations of the amount of free information and partial loan guarantees that the MFI chooses 
to make available before negotiating a loan package. We anticipate that the optimal loan size 
would increase by moving to such a general equilibrium framework and that the lenders 








Ausubel, L., “Partially Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium in a Competitive Economy”, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 50, 1990, p. 93-126. 
 
Bardlevy , G. and P. Veronesi, “Information Acquisition in Financial Markets”,  Review of 
Economic Studies, 67, 2000, p. 79-90. 
 
Barney, D. and J. Alse, “Predicting LDC Debt Rescheduling: Performance Evaluation of OLS, 
Logit, and Neural Network Models”, Journal of Forecasting, 20, 2001, p. 603-615. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and H. Huizinga,  “Official Credits to Developing Countries: Implicit Transfers 
to the Banks”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(3), 1993, p. 430 - 444. 
 
Eckaus, Richard,  “Observations on the Conditionality of International Financial Institutions”, 
World Development, 10(9), 1982, p. 767 - 780. 
 
Grossman G. and Joseph Stiglitz,  “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets”, 
American Economic Review, 70(3), 1980, p. 393-408. 
 
Hilbers, P., R. Krueger and M. Moretti, “New Tools for Assessing Financial System Soundness”, 
Finance and Development, 37(3), 2000. 
 
Hwang, H -S., “Optimal Information Acquisition for Heterogenous Duopoly Firms”,  Journal of 
Economic Theory, 59, 1993, p. 385-402. 
 
__________, “Information Acquisition and Relative Efficiency of Competitive, Oligopoly and 
Monopoly Markets”, International Economic Review, 36, 1995, p. 325-340. 
 
Kester, A., “Improving the Framework for Reporting on International Reserves”, Finance and 





Kletzer, K., “Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk”, Economic 
Journal, 94(374), 1984, p. 287-307. 
 
Laopodis, N., “Optimal Prediction Rule: An Application to Debt Reschedulings”,  Applied 
Economics, 31(1), 1999, p. 17-26. 
 
Lee, Boon-Chye ,  The Economics of International Debt Renegotiation, Westview Press, 1993. 
 
Levine, Carolyn and Michael Smith, “Information Dissemination by Insiders in Equilibrium”, 
Journal of Financial Markets, 6, 2003, p. 23 – 47. 
 
Lissakers, Karin,  Banks, Borrowers and the Establishment: A Revisionist Account of the 
International Debt Crisis, New York: Basic Books, 1991. 
 
Melvin, Michael,  International Money and Finance, 4th Ed., HarperCollins College Publishers, 
1995. 
 
Mosley, P., J. Harrigan and J. Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending, 
London: Routledge, 1991. 
 
Rodriguez, Ennio,  “The Political Economy of Banking Regulations”, in Rodriguez, E. and S. 
Griffith-Jones (eds.), Cross-Conditionality Banking Regulation and Third World Debt, Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1992. 
 
Verrechia, R., “Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy”, 



































































































































Simulated values over 
2















































































































































































d s  
2














































































































































































































































































































































































































d s  